CAJ | 학술논문

本文基于中国债权人保护程度较弱的现实，以2000～2007年的上市公司为样本，对银行能否利用债务期限应对企业的盈余管理行为进行了深入研究。本文发现银行无法整体上识别企业的盈余管理以授予其相应的债务期限。本文进一步将银行识别企业盈余管理行为的意愿和技术进行分离而予以单独检验。通过选择明显有舞弊嫌疑的非标准无保留审计意见企业和微利企业以控制住银行的识别技术，发现银行给予非标审计意见企业较严格的债务期限，但没有给予微利企业较严格的债务期限，说明银行有一定的识别意愿。
본문기우중국채권인보호정도교약적현실，이2000～2007년적상시공사위양본，대은행능부이용채무기한응대기업적영여관리행위진행료심입연구。본문발현은행무법정체상식별기업적영여관리이수여기상응적채무기한。본문진일보장은행식별기업영여관리행위적의원화기술진행분리이여이단독검험。통과선택명현유무폐혐의적비표준무보류심계의견기업화미리기업이공제주은행적식별기술，발현은행급여비표심계의견기업교엄격적채무기한，단몰유급여미리기업교엄격적채무기한，설명은행유일정적식별의원。
This paper studies whether Chinese banks can cope with listed companies＇ earnings management behaviors by debt maturity based on the facts of weak creditor protection in China. The evidence gotten by this paper suggests that Chinese banks cannot discern companies＇ earnings management to adjust their debt maturity as a whole. Furthermore, this paper disentangles the aspiration and the technique for Chinese banks to discern companies＇ manipulating behaviors and check them separately.