北京化工大学学报:社会科学版
北京化工大學學報:社會科學版
북경화공대학학보:사회과학판
Journal of Beijing University of Chemical Technology:Social Sciences Edition
2011年
4期
11-14,21
,共5页
专利共有%交易成本%博弈论%公地悲剧
專利共有%交易成本%博弈論%公地悲劇
전리공유%교역성본%박혁론%공지비극
patent co-ownership%transaction cost%game theory%tragedy of commons
作为一种法律上允许的企业垄断或日联合行为.专利共有的制度安排应当是立法对现实经济中个体在制度需求上的确认。但运用经济分析中常见的交易成本、博弈论等分析有关现行规定后不难发现.我国的专利共有制度安排在一定情形下反而增加了合作研发的交易成本.并有导致共有人竞相发放许可的倾向,以致许可利益被稀释、压低至边际成本。因此,完善共有专利许可及其费用分配的规则势在必行.以降低交易成本、促进资源有效配置和经济效益最大化;同时,让各专利共有人必须在一定的许可协议下才能对外许可.以避免公地悲剧的可能。
作為一種法律上允許的企業壟斷或日聯閤行為.專利共有的製度安排應噹是立法對現實經濟中箇體在製度需求上的確認。但運用經濟分析中常見的交易成本、博弈論等分析有關現行規定後不難髮現.我國的專利共有製度安排在一定情形下反而增加瞭閤作研髮的交易成本.併有導緻共有人競相髮放許可的傾嚮,以緻許可利益被稀釋、壓低至邊際成本。因此,完善共有專利許可及其費用分配的規則勢在必行.以降低交易成本、促進資源有效配置和經濟效益最大化;同時,讓各專利共有人必鬚在一定的許可協議下纔能對外許可.以避免公地悲劇的可能。
작위일충법률상윤허적기업롱단혹일연합행위.전리공유적제도안배응당시입법대현실경제중개체재제도수구상적학인。단운용경제분석중상견적교역성본、박혁론등분석유관현행규정후불난발현.아국적전리공유제도안배재일정정형하반이증가료합작연발적교역성본.병유도치공유인경상발방허가적경향,이치허가이익피희석、압저지변제성본。인차,완선공유전리허가급기비용분배적규칙세재필행.이강저교역성본、촉진자원유효배치화경제효익최대화;동시,양각전리공유인필수재일정적허가협의하재능대외허가.이피면공지비극적가능。
As a legally allowed monopoly or joint action, the system of patent co-ownership should be a kind of leg- islative confirmation on the individual needs existing in our practical economy. But reviewed by the commonly used economic analytical means such as transaction cost and game theory, our patent co-ownership arrangements are surprisingly found under circumstances that it brings out a burden to the transaction cost of co-development, and that it may dilute the owner's interests or even comer the interests to marginal cost due to the tendency of abused license by its co-owners. Therefore, it is necessary to make further study and improvement on patent li- cense and profit distribution arrangement to lower down the transaction cost, and to reach the target of effective source distribution and profit maximization. Meanwhile, it is necessary to limit the patent license among the co-owners under a certain agreement to avoid the tendency of tragedy of commons.