计算机集成制造系统
計算機集成製造繫統
계산궤집성제조계통
COMPUTER INTEGRATED MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS
2010年
2期
356-364,379
,共10页
供应链%协调机制%收益共享%回购契约%模糊需求%可信性分布
供應鏈%協調機製%收益共享%迴購契約%模糊需求%可信性分佈
공응련%협조궤제%수익공향%회구계약%모호수구%가신성분포
supply chain%coordination mechanism%revenue sharing%return contract%fuzzy demand%credibility distribution
为保证供应链成员获得利润,在模糊需求环境下,研究由单一供应商和零售商组成的两级供应链系统的协调机制问题.将市场需求视为模糊变量,建立不确定理论下基于可信性分布的分散决策、集中决策,以及收益共享契约和回购契约模型,并以三角模糊变量为例对模型进行优化,给出各种模型下的最优策略.最后,通过数值算例对模型中的参数进行求解,并对分析结论进行验证.研究结果表明,在模糊需求环境下,供应链系统中依然存在"双重边际化"效应,通过在协调机制中改变契约系数可以使供应链各成员的期望利润相比分散决策时有明显提高,并且当谈判双方达成纳什谈判解时,成员在收益共享契约下的期望利润等于其在回购契约下的期望利润.
為保證供應鏈成員穫得利潤,在模糊需求環境下,研究由單一供應商和零售商組成的兩級供應鏈繫統的協調機製問題.將市場需求視為模糊變量,建立不確定理論下基于可信性分佈的分散決策、集中決策,以及收益共享契約和迴購契約模型,併以三角模糊變量為例對模型進行優化,給齣各種模型下的最優策略.最後,通過數值算例對模型中的參數進行求解,併對分析結論進行驗證.研究結果錶明,在模糊需求環境下,供應鏈繫統中依然存在"雙重邊際化"效應,通過在協調機製中改變契約繫數可以使供應鏈各成員的期望利潤相比分散決策時有明顯提高,併且噹談判雙方達成納什談判解時,成員在收益共享契約下的期望利潤等于其在迴購契約下的期望利潤.
위보증공응련성원획득리윤,재모호수구배경하,연구유단일공응상화령수상조성적량급공응련계통적협조궤제문제.장시장수구시위모호변량,건립불학정이론하기우가신성분포적분산결책、집중결책,이급수익공향계약화회구계약모형,병이삼각모호변량위례대모형진행우화,급출각충모형하적최우책략.최후,통과수치산례대모형중적삼수진행구해,병대분석결론진행험증.연구결과표명,재모호수구배경하,공응련계통중의연존재"쌍중변제화"효응,통과재협조궤제중개변계약계수가이사공응련각성원적기망리윤상비분산결책시유명현제고,병차당담판쌍방체성납십담판해시,성원재수익공향계약하적기망리윤등우기재회구계약하적기망리윤.
To guarantee profit for supply chain memebers,in a two-stage supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer,the supply chain coordination mechanism was studied under a fuzzy demand environment.The market demand was considered as a fuzzy variable.Models of decentralized decision,centralized decision,revenue sharing contract and return contract under uncertain theory were constructed based on credibility distribution.Triangular fuzzy variable was used to optimize these models and their optimal policies were also presented.Finally,numerical example was applied to resolve parameters in these models,and analysis results were also verified.Under a fuzzy demand environment,it was revealed that the double marginalization effect still existed.In supply chain coordination mechanism,the expected profit of the members could be improved remarkably compared to in decentralized decision by changing contract coefficient.In addition,the expected profits for each member in revenue sharing contract were equaled to that in return contract when Nash-bargaining solution was reached.