合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）
閤肥工業大學學報（自然科學版）
합비공업대학학보（자연과학판）
JOURNAL OF HEFEI UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY(NATURAL SCIENCE)
2009年
11期
1749-1752
,共4页
评标%委托代理%博弈%道德风险
評標%委託代理%博弈%道德風險
평표%위탁대리%박혁%도덕풍험
evaluation of bids%principal-agent%game theory%moral hazard
文章运用博弈论中的委托代理理论,对建设工程评标专家的激励约束IC与参与约束IR进行了研究,从信息对称与信息不对称2个角度分析了评标专家的努力水平和实际收入、业主的期望收入,从IC和IR均成立、IR不成立、IC不成立、IC和IR均不成立分析了评标专家的努力工作水平、努力工作的成本系数、风险规避度及产出方差和业主的收益;分析表明委托代理关系中的IC和IR相比,IC更为重要,业主想要提高评标效果,就必须设计相应的激励措施,诱使评标专家努力工作,以抑制不道德的发生.
文章運用博弈論中的委託代理理論,對建設工程評標專傢的激勵約束IC與參與約束IR進行瞭研究,從信息對稱與信息不對稱2箇角度分析瞭評標專傢的努力水平和實際收入、業主的期望收入,從IC和IR均成立、IR不成立、IC不成立、IC和IR均不成立分析瞭評標專傢的努力工作水平、努力工作的成本繫數、風險規避度及產齣方差和業主的收益;分析錶明委託代理關繫中的IC和IR相比,IC更為重要,業主想要提高評標效果,就必鬚設計相應的激勵措施,誘使評標專傢努力工作,以抑製不道德的髮生.
문장운용박혁론중적위탁대리이론,대건설공정평표전가적격려약속IC여삼여약속IR진행료연구,종신식대칭여신식불대칭2개각도분석료평표전가적노력수평화실제수입、업주적기망수입,종IC화IR균성립、IR불성립、IC불성립、IC화IR균불성립분석료평표전가적노력공작수평、노력공작적성본계수、풍험규피도급산출방차화업주적수익;분석표명위탁대리관계중적IC화IR상비,IC경위중요,업주상요제고평표효과,취필수설계상응적격려조시,유사평표전가노력공작,이억제불도덕적발생.
In view of the poor performance of the bid evaluation committee, the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint and the individual rationality (IR) constraint in the principal-agent relationship between the bid inviting party and the bid evaluation committee are analyzed according to the game theory. The performance and real income of evaluation experts and the anticipant income of the bid inviting party are analyzed from the angles of the symmetric and asymmetric information. The performance, work cost, measure of risk aversion, and output variance of the bid evaluation committee and the bid inviting party income are discussed under the following different conditions: existence of both the IC and the IR, inexistence of the IR, inexistence of the IC, and absence of the IC and IR . The results show that the IC constraint is more important than the IR. If the bid inviting party wants to improve the bid evaluation efficiency, it must adopt incentive mechanisms which can make the bid evaluation committee work harder and keep the moral hazard under control.
