CAJ | 학술논문

企业在与外包服务商签订完外包合同之后，需要对这种外包关系进行有效的管理，恰当的监督与激励是防范服务商机会主义行为的有效途径。通过运用不完全契约理论对服务外包不完全契约性的分析，揭示了这种不完全契约性给服务外包带来的影响，认为企业与外包服务商要建立起一种以正式的外包合同为基础，关系合同为补充的激励机制，并运用完善的服务商风险防范机制对服务商进行监督。
기업재여외포복무상첨정완외포합동지후，수요대저충외포관계진행유효적관리，흡당적감독여격려시방범복무상궤회주의행위적유효도경。통과운용불완전계약이론대복무외포불완전계약성적분석，게시료저충불완전계약성급복무외포대래적영향，인위기업여외포복무상요건립기일충이정식적외포합동위기출，관계합동위보충적격려궤제，병운용완선적복무상풍험방범궤제대복무상진행감독。
Corporate and outseureing service providers in outsourcing contracts signed after completion, this would require the effective management of outseurcing relationships, appropriate supervision and incentives to guard against opportunistic behavior of service providers an effective way. Through the use of incomplete contract theory of incomplete contractual outsonreing analysis, revealed that incomplete contract of service outseureing to the impact of that business and outseureing service providers to establish a formal outsourcing contract basis , the contract for the complementary relationship between the incentives and the use of sound risk prevention mechanism for service providers to monitor service providers.