CAJ | 학술논문

该文主要针对工业污染，利用博弈论分析了厂商、居民和政府在保护环境中的实际行为决策过程，各类博弈最后得到的解具有一个共性，不利于环境保护的纳什均衡，即形成非合作博弈。结论指出，必须结合市场机制和政府政策改变各博弈方的收益，使博弈达到新的纳什均衡，提高环境保护效率
해문주요침대공업오염，이용박혁론분석료엄상、거민화정부재보호배경중적실제행위결책과정，각류박혁최후득도적해구유일개공성，불리우배경보호적납십균형，즉형성비합작박혁。결론지출，필수결합시장궤제화정부정책개변각박혁방적수익，사박혁체도신적납십균형，제고배경보호효솔
The processes of behavioral decision made by firms, households and governments in the environmental protection are analyzed with the game theory, aiming at the industrial pollution. And the outcomes of these games have a common characteristic: Nash equilibrium that is harmful to environmental protection (non-cooperative game). It's also put forward that the profits of all players must be changed with combining market mechanism with government control to obtain a new equilibrium and to improve the efficiency of environmental protection.