CAJ | 학술논문

本文沿着中国企业激励制度市场化改革和全球公司治理趋同这两条主线,基于超越最优契约范式的市场配置视角、经理权力视角以及契约订立过程中的参照点效应,提出了关于中国上市公司高管薪酬决定因素的三组理论假设.基于502家上市公司2001至2006年平衡面板数据的实证研究显示,高管薪酬水平的上升反映了市场对经理才能日益增长的竞争性需求,但旨在约束经理权力、构架"完备"的公司治理机制并未发挥有效作用.此外,国际同行的薪酬基准对中国公司的高管薪酬决策具有参照点效应,这种薪酬设定过程中存在的参照点效应因薪酬委员会的存在而被放大.
본문연착중국기업격려제도시장화개혁화전구공사치리추동저량조주선,기우초월최우계약범식적시장배치시각、경리권력시각이급계약정립과정중적삼조점효응,제출료관우중국상시공사고관신수결정인소적삼조이론가설.기우502가상시공사2001지2006년평형면판수거적실증연구현시,고관신수수평적상승반영료시장대경리재능일익증장적경쟁성수구,단지재약속경리권력、구가"완비"적공사치리궤제병미발휘유효작용.차외,국제동행적신수기준대중국공사적고관신수결책구유삼조점효응,저충신수설정과정중존재적삼조점효응인신수위원회적존재이피방대.
This paper investigates the determinants of Chinese executive compensation under the market oriented reforms and global governance convergence.We contribute to corporate governance literature of executive compensation by building an integrated theoretical model,combining market force approach as an extension of optimal contracting theory,managerial power approach and behaveoural contracting approach.We propose three hypotheses from the perspectives of market demand for managerial talents,managerial power and global pay reference point effect with regard to the Chinese executive pay setting process.We further provide empirical tests for our hypotheses using a panel analysis as an improvement for the short-period cross sectional analysis adopted by the extant literature on Chinese executive compensation.Our panel data set enables us to control the potential biased problem caused by unobservable individual and time effects,which is particularly important given the information disclosure limitations in China.The rich information contents from the large observations also allow us to reveal the dynamic evolution of Chinese executive compensation.Our findings show that the increasing pay level of Chinese executive reflects competitive market demand for manager talents.Large firms with complex operations and growing firms with more growing opportunities and better prior performance tend to provide pay premiums for manager talents.However,Chinese corporate governance mechanisms do not seem to be functioning in restraining managerial influence on and their possible manipulation in their pay setting process.Those managers who also serve as the board chairman are likely to receive higher compensation.Executive shareholding also has an influence oil the board pay decisions.With regard to the ownership,we find block shareholders in Chinese firms play a positive role in constraining managers' self-dealing on their pay level.Finally,the competitive global pay benchmark has a considerable impact on the decisions of compensation committee on executive pay level,particularly in those firms that involve foreign investments,therefore,tend to award generous pay package to their executives.