CAJ | 학술논문

将古典经济学模型中的Bertrand双寡头模型推广到了N人的情况.在量子化的博弈中,随着所加纠缠的增大,收益也增大.并且,收益值将不断增长直至达到最优的“合作收益”值.而这个“合作收益”的值在经典博弈的非合作情况中是无法达到的.我们的量子化方法是,在相邻两公司间加入部分信息纠缠.推广到N人的Bertrand模型不但解决了Bertrand模型中的悖论,而且得到一个较为可行的结论.
장고전경제학모형중적Bertrand쌍과두모형추엄도료N인적정황.재양자화적박혁중,수착소가규전적증대,수익야증대.병차,수익치장불단증장직지체도최우적“합작수익”치.이저개“합작수익”적치재경전박혁적비합작정황중시무법체도적.아문적양자화방법시,재상린량공사간가입부분신식규전.추엄도N인적Bertrand모형불단해결료Bertrand모형중적패론,이차득도일개교위가행적결론.
The quantum game of the classical Bertrand's duopoly model was generalized to N-player case.In a quantized game,the more entanglement is involved,the higher maximal profits it will be.It monotonously increases until the optimal collusive profit,which is restricted,and cannot be achieved in its classical game.With partial information entanglement between two adjacent firms,the generalizing evolutionary N-player Bertrand's model not only solved the Bertrand paradox,but also achieved a practical result.