电力系统自动化
電力繫統自動化
전력계통자동화
AUTOMATION OF ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS
2009年
22期
18-24
,共7页
张富强%文福拴%颜汉荣%余志伟%钟志勇%黄杰波
張富彊%文福拴%顏漢榮%餘誌偉%鐘誌勇%黃傑波
장부강%문복전%안한영%여지위%종지용%황걸파
无功电力市场%市场力%智能体代理仿真%统一价格结算%按报价结算%无功价格成本裕度指标
無功電力市場%市場力%智能體代理倣真%統一價格結算%按報價結算%無功價格成本裕度指標
무공전력시장%시장력%지능체대리방진%통일개격결산%안보개결산%무공개격성본유도지표
reactive electricity market%market power%agent-based simulation%uniform-price auction%pay as bid%reactive power price cost margin index
在无功市场的规划和设计阶段,潜在的市场力是一个必须认真考虑的重要问题.现有的无功市场力评估指标大都只考虑了电力系统的技术特征,没有考虑市场参与者的策略性投标行为.在此背景下,提出了基于智能体代理的市场仿真方法以研究无功市场中参与者的博弈行为,其中采用了模仿者动态算法来模拟参与者追求利润最大化的理性行为.发展了计及发电机强制(免费)无功出力要求的统一价格竞价模式和按报价结算竞价模式,并利用得到的结算电价计算无功市场力指标,即无功价格成本裕度指标.最后,以CIGRE 32节点系统为例说明了所述方法的基本特征.算例分析结果表明:在统一价格结算模式下,潜在的市场力比按报价结算模式下更为严重.
在無功市場的規劃和設計階段,潛在的市場力是一箇必鬚認真攷慮的重要問題.現有的無功市場力評估指標大都隻攷慮瞭電力繫統的技術特徵,沒有攷慮市場參與者的策略性投標行為.在此揹景下,提齣瞭基于智能體代理的市場倣真方法以研究無功市場中參與者的博弈行為,其中採用瞭模倣者動態算法來模擬參與者追求利潤最大化的理性行為.髮展瞭計及髮電機彊製(免費)無功齣力要求的統一價格競價模式和按報價結算競價模式,併利用得到的結算電價計算無功市場力指標,即無功價格成本裕度指標.最後,以CIGRE 32節點繫統為例說明瞭所述方法的基本特徵.算例分析結果錶明:在統一價格結算模式下,潛在的市場力比按報價結算模式下更為嚴重.
재무공시장적규화화설계계단,잠재적시장력시일개필수인진고필적중요문제.현유적무공시장력평고지표대도지고필료전력계통적기술특정,몰유고필시장삼여자적책략성투표행위.재차배경하,제출료기우지능체대리적시장방진방법이연구무공시장중삼여자적박혁행위,기중채용료모방자동태산법래모의삼여자추구리윤최대화적이성행위.발전료계급발전궤강제(면비)무공출력요구적통일개격경개모식화안보개결산경개모식,병이용득도적결산전개계산무공시장력지표,즉무공개격성본유도지표.최후,이CIGRE 32절점계통위례설명료소술방법적기본특정.산례분석결과표명:재통일개격결산모식하,잠재적시장력비안보개결산모식하경위엄중.
Market power in a potential reactive electricity market at planning and design stage has been regarded as a vital problem for its negative effect on the efficient operation of the market. Up to now, research work on the evaluation index for market power in the reactive electricity market has been mainly based on technical characteristics of a power system, and the strategic bidding behavior of market participants is not taken into account. Given this background, an agent-based market simulation framework is presented for analyzing the gaming behaviors of1 reactive power suppliers and the resulting market power of participants. The replicator dynamics algorithm is utilized to simulate the agents' rational behavior for profit maximization. Two mathematical models, in which the mandatory reactive power requirement is not/is imposed for reactive power suppliers, are respectively developed for describing the uniform-price auction and pas-as-bid (PAB) auction in a reactive electricity market. The market power is then analyzed by employing the well-known price cost margin index. The CIGRE 32-bus system is used for numerical studies. Simulation results demonstrate the essential features of the developed model and method, and that reactive market power in the uniform-price auction is more significant than that in the PAB auction.This work is jointly supported by Special Fund of the National Basic Research Program of China (No. 2004CB217905),and National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 70673023).