委托-授权、工会合并及企业合并行为选择研究
위탁-수권、공회합병급기업합병행위선택연구
Delegation, Union Merger and Choice of Behavior about Firm Merger
  • 万方数据
    管理学报 관이학보
    CHINESE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT
    2010年 3期 350-353 ,共4页

    沈悦%徐有俊%赵旖旎

    침열%서유준%조의니

    委托-授权%工资讨价%合并 委託-授權%工資討價%閤併
    위탁-수권%공자토개%합병
    delegation%wage bargaining%merger
    基于委托-授权下的Cournot寡头竞争市场模型,分析了工会的合并是否会刺激企业的合并.通过4阶段博弈的子博弈完美纳什均衡解,发现2个相互独立的工会将会为了得到更大的利益而合并,但这种合并不利于企业所得的增加.
    기우위탁-수권하적Cournot과두경쟁시장모형,분석료공회적합병시부회자격기업적합병.통과4계단박혁적자박혁완미납십균형해,발현2개상호독립적공회장회위료득도경대적이익이합병,단저충합병불리우기업소득적증가.
    The paper analyses a duopolistic market Cournot model to examine how unions affect the incentives for the merger of firms. By the solution of subgame perfect equilibrium of four-stage game, we find out that two independent unions would unite as a single union in order to get a greater surplus, but the merger will do harm to the increase of the firms' gains.
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