CAJ | 학술논문

为了解决中小企业贷款的担保问题,同一个工业园区或一个产业链条上企业间的担保贷款,即团体贷款就成为解决问题的一种方式.利用动态博弈模型,采用仿真的方法对团体贷款中影响银企贷款行为的因素进行了研究,得出通过企业的动态学习,均衡下的企业策略随着社会惩罚和外部惩罚的变动而变动.当外部惩罚足够严厉时,这时的企业策略选择不仅仅只比较团体内部各参与人收益大小,还要考虑同团体中其他个体进行比较.
위료해결중소기업대관적담보문제,동일개공업완구혹일개산업련조상기업간적담보대관,즉단체대관취성위해결문제적일충방식.이용동태박혁모형,채용방진적방법대단체대관중영향은기대관행위적인소진행료연구,득출통과기업적동태학습,균형하적기업책략수착사회징벌화외부징벌적변동이변동.당외부징벌족구엄려시,저시적기업책략선택불부부지비교단체내부각삼여인수익대소,환요고필동단체중기타개체진행비교.
Enterprises in an industrial park or an industry chain applying loans to banks as groups in which the members providing mutual security to each other has become a way to solve the problem of the lack of enough guarantee. Based on dynamic game model under complete information, this paper does some research on factors which have some impact on SMES' behavior of group lending using simulation method. The enterprises' strategy under equilibrium changes as the social and outside punishments change through dynamic learning. When the outside punishment is severe enough, the enterprises will not only compare the income with participant within group but also with other groups. The cooperation strategy of enterprises is the best strategy of whole enterprises participate in group Lending.