CAJ | 학술논문

对政府和农资生产企业进行完全信息动态博弈分析，并求得其混合战略纳什均衡解。基于此，提出降低农资生产企业治污的成本和政府检查的成本，加重对违规排污农资生产企业行贿、对政府部门滥用职权的罚款，将会利于农资生产企业的治污，提高政府检查的频率，降低农资生产企业的行贿、政府滥用职权的概率。
대정부화농자생산기업진행완전신식동태박혁분석，병구득기혼합전략납십균형해。기우차，제출강저농자생산기업치오적성본화정부검사적성본，가중대위규배오농자생산기업행회、대정부부문람용직권적벌관，장회리우농자생산기업적치오，제고정부검사적빈솔，강저농자생산기업적행회、정부람용직권적개솔。
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution is obtained by use of dynamic game model between government and agricultural material production enterprise with complete information in environment pollution control. Based on this, the paper holds that it is beneficial to both government and the agricultural material production enterprises by reducing the cost of agricultural material production enterprises for controlling pollution and the cost of government inspection and increasing the penalty for the bribery behaviors and illegal drain contamination by agricultural material production enterprises and the penalty for government＇ s abusing of authority.