CAJ | 학술논문

研究由一个供应商和一个下游零售商构成的面向单一短生命周期产品和不确定市场需求的两级时间竞争型供应链的分销系统.供应链的上下游双方对市场需求波动的预测是信息不对称的,建立了最优承诺配送时间、订货量和批发价格的决策模型.通过和完全信息下,供应链上下游最优决策的对比分析,探讨了供应链上下游间共享需求波动信息的潜在价值及单一价格契约、收益共享契约和回购契约对信息共享的影响.结果表明,当零售商对市场需求波动的预测值小于实际值时,单一价格契约不能达到供应链协调;而合理的收益共享契约和回购契约将促进供应链上下游的信息共享和整个渠道利润的提高.
연구유일개공응상화일개하유령수상구성적면향단일단생명주기산품화불학정시장수구적량급시간경쟁형공응련적분소계통.공응련적상하유쌍방대시장수구파동적예측시신식불대칭적,건립료최우승낙배송시간、정화량화비발개격적결책모형.통과화완전신식하,공응련상하유최우결책적대비분석,탐토료공응련상하유간공향수구파동신식적잠재개치급단일개격계약、수익공향계약화회구계약대신식공향적영향.결과표명,당령수상대시장수구파동적예측치소우실제치시,단일개격계약불능체도공응련협조;이합리적수익공향계약화회구계약장촉진공응련상하유적신식공향화정개거도리윤적제고.
Consider a distribution channel of a two echelon time competitive supply chain with one supplier and one downstream retailer facing a product market characterized by short product life and uncertain demand. In addition, the estimation of demand volatility from the supplier and the retailer is asymmetric. Decision models of optimal planned delivery lead time, ordering quantities, and unit wholesale price are established. Compared with the optimal decisions under the complete information on demand volatility, the potential benefits of information sharing and its impacts on the only wholesale price contract, revenue sharing contract, and buyback contract are examined. Results show that the only wholesale price contract cannot reach the channel coordination when the retailer underestimates the demand volatility while the supplier does not, but the reasonable profit sharing contract as well as the buyback contract benefit to facilitate information sharing and to improve the profits of the entire channel.