CAJ | 학술논문

以洪湖湿地自然保护区的拆网政策为例,通过渔民的围网博弈过程,分析补贴在自然保护区自然资源管理过程中的作用.结果显示,由于自然保护区自然资源的公共物品特点,导致自然保护区陷入公地悲剧陷阱.一次性补贴在激励渔民放弃过度围网行为方面起到了重要的作用.但是就长期而言,由于自然保护区的公共物品特征仍然存在,渔民在生产决策过程中仍然有"搭便车"的可能,单纯采用补贴政策不仅不能起到有效的作用,反而会导致过度利用自然资源的行为更多地发生.从博弈分析来看,要完全避免自然保护区的公地悲剧,应当以补贴为基础,结合政府的严格管理,进行其他制度创新,以实现保护的长效激励机制.
이홍호습지자연보호구적탁망정책위례,통과어민적위망박혁과정,분석보첩재자연보호구자연자원관리과정중적작용.결과현시,유우자연보호구자연자원적공공물품특점,도치자연보호구함입공지비극함정.일차성보첩재격려어민방기과도위망행위방면기도료중요적작용.단시취장기이언,유우자연보호구적공공물품특정잉연존재,어민재생산결책과정중잉연유"탑편차"적가능,단순채용보첩정책불부불능기도유효적작용,반이회도치과도이용자연자원적행위경다지발생.종박혁분석래간,요완전피면자연보호구적공지비극,응당이보첩위기출,결합정부적엄격관리,진행기타제도창신,이실현보호적장효격려궤제.
Taking Honghu Wetland Natural Reserve as an example, game of fishers during fish culture was modeled and the impact of subsidies on the management and protection of the Natural Reserve was analyzed. Results showed that subsidy played important role in preventing over-fish culturing in a short time. But in a long run, it failed to protect the resource and reduplicate subsidies would even induce the destroying of natural resource. Natural reserve falls into the tragedy of commons due to their common property fights. To avoid the tragedy of commons, new kind of reform of management system is claimed.