CAJ | 학술논문

针对人力资源信息管理中＂理性经济人＂员工无法被管理者完全信任的问题,提出了一种新的非线性激励数学模型,实现了人力资源的激励策略优化。将该模型应用于不合格产品检测问题的案例,理论分析结果表明不诚实员工成功欺骗管理者的概率为1/n,其中n为激励检测样本集合元素的个数,从而证明了该激励模型的有效性。
침대인력자원신식관리중＂이성경제인＂원공무법피관리자완전신임적문제,제출료일충신적비선성격려수학모형,실현료인력자원적격려책략우화。장해모형응용우불합격산품검측문제적안례,이론분석결과표명불성실원공성공기편관리자적개솔위1/n,기중n위격려검측양본집합원소적개수,종이증명료해격려모형적유효성。
For the purpose of solving trust problem of the employee as a rational economic man, a new non-linear incentive strategy model is presented for human resources information management. The given model is applied in the case of unqualified products detection, and the theoretical results prove that the probability of the dishonest employee cheating the manger successfully is 1/n, where n is the cardinality of the incentive set. Therefore, the incentive model is effective in the real applications.