CAJ | 학술논문

从符合实证结论的角度给出了付费搜索拍卖中广告主价值的假设,构建了GSP机制的一般框架,并证明了广告主关于位置具有随排名递降而严格递减的价值时,GSP机制能够实现任意一个存在的无嫉妒匹配,从而也能实现VCG结果,进一步指出为实现有效配置的GSP付费函数的形式并不是唯一的.
종부합실증결론적각도급출료부비수색박매중엄고주개치적가설,구건료GSP궤제적일반광가,병증명료엄고주관우위치구유수배명체강이엄격체감적개치시,GSP궤제능구실현임의일개존재적무질투필배,종이야능실현VCG결과,진일보지출위실현유효배치적GSP부비함수적형식병불시유일적.
By setting the hypothesis on advertisers' values in sponsored search auctions in accordance with empiri-cal results, this paper establishes a general framework of GSP mechanism, and proves that when advertisers have values strictly descending with the ascending of positions, any envy-free matching can be realized so that VCG outcome can be reached. It is also pointed out that the GSP paying function is not unique to realize the efficient Equilibria.