CAJ | 학술논문

电力市场的两种基本竞价机制为传统的统一边际价竞价机制（SMP机制）和按报价支付的竞价机制（PAB机制）。首先从拍卖角度出发讨论两种竞价机制激励性,并对两种机制下发电商行使市场力的机理进行了深入分析。分析得出,无论是统一边际价竞价机制还是按报价支付的竞价机制都缺乏让发电商按真实成本信息报价的激励相容性,存在发电商虚报高价的现象,影响电力系统的稳定运行和经济调度。因而需要设计一种新的具有激励相容特性的价格机制。
전력시장적량충기본경개궤제위전통적통일변제개경개궤제（SMP궤제）화안보개지부적경개궤제（PAB궤제）。수선종박매각도출발토론량충경개궤제격려성,병대량충궤제하발전상행사시장력적궤리진행료심입분석。분석득출,무론시통일변제개경개궤제환시안보개지부적경개궤제도결핍양발전상안진실성본신식보개적격려상용성,존재발전상허보고개적현상,영향전력계통적은정운행화경제조도。인이수요설계일충신적구유격려상용특성적개격궤제。
The two basic mechanisms of electricity market are the traditional system marginal price bidding mechanism and pay-as-bid auction mechanism.This paper discussed the incentive compatibility of SMP and PAB auction mechanism from the auction point of view,and then make an in-depth analysis of the reason why power generators abuse market power under the two basic mechanisms.Through the analysis we can get the conclusion that both the SMP and PAB auction mechanism are lack of the incentive compatibility which make power generators bid according to the true cost information,so it affects the stability of the electrical power system and the economic power dispatch.Thus,a new bidding mechanism with the incentive compatibility is needed.