CAJ | 학술논문

　　构建不同自然状态和创新水平下创业企业的双边道德风险模型，研究表明可转债能够有效地缓解创业企业的双边道德风险，其内嵌的债权契约能够保证在自然状态较差时，VC 通过再谈判的方式引导 EN 做出社会最优的创新选择，并且激励双方投入社会最优的努力水平。在自然状态较好时，EN 有动力选择高的创新水平，并且设计合理的可转债契约同样能够提供有效的激励促使双方选择社会最优的努力水平。
　　구건불동자연상태화창신수평하창업기업적쌍변도덕풍험모형，연구표명가전채능구유효지완해창업기업적쌍변도덕풍험，기내감적채권계약능구보증재자연상태교차시，VC 통과재담판적방식인도 EN 주출사회최우적창신선택，병차격려쌍방투입사회최우적노력수평。재자연상태교호시，EN 유동력선택고적창신수평，병차설계합리적가전채계약동양능구제공유효적격려촉사쌍방선택사회최우적노력수평。
Constructing a double-sided moral hazard model under different levels of natural and innovative, research shows that convertible bonds can effectively alleviate the double-sided moral hazard in venture, the debt contract embedded in convertible bonds ensure that VC can push EN to choose the socially optimal levels of innovation and inspire the two sides select the Socially optimal effort levels in the poor state of nature. When the state of nature is good, EN would choose the high levels of innovation, well-designed convertible bonds also can provide effective incentives to promote the both sides to choose the socially optimal level of efforts.