CAJ | 학술논문

　　基于股权特征的视角，以2000-2011年中国13家上市银行的经验数据为样本，对大股东间利益驱逐的行为抉择与银行绩效的关系作了实证分析。研究表明：股权集中度对银行绩效具有显著的负作用；并且，随着股权集中度增大，对银行绩效的削弱能力就越强。股权制衡度与银行绩效间呈显著倒U型关系，即其他大股东对第一大股东的利益驱逐不仅具有制衡作用，而且存在“利益共谋”的可能性。因此，应规范大股东资本市场运作行为，提高银行信息披露的透明度，健全中小投资者“参政”网络渠道。
　　기우고권특정적시각，이2000-2011년중국13가상시은행적경험수거위양본，대대고동간이익구축적행위결택여은행적효적관계작료실증분석。연구표명：고권집중도대은행적효구유현저적부작용；병차，수착고권집중도증대，대은행적효적삭약능력취월강。고권제형도여은행적효간정현저도U형관계，즉기타대고동대제일대고동적이익구축불부구유제형작용，이차존재“이익공모”적가능성。인차，응규범대고동자본시장운작행위，제고은행신식피로적투명도，건전중소투자자“삼정”망락거도。
From the view of characteristics of ownership, it makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between behavior choice of interest pursuing among big shareholders and bank's performance in China, by taking13 listed Banks in our country's empirical data from 2000 to 2011 as samples. The study indicates that ownership concentration has significant negative effects on bank performance. By the way, as the degree of ownership concentration increases, the ability of weakening bank performance is stronger. The relationship between ownership restriction and bank performance is a significant inverted-U shaped, means that other big shareholders is not only a restriction to interest pursuing of the first big shareholder, but also there is the possibility of"collusion of interest"between them. Therefore, we should regulate the behavior of shareholders' capital operation, improve the transparency of bank information disclosure, perfect the small and medium-sized investors's network channels of "participating" .