CAJ | 학술논문

文章以2007-2012年 A 股上市公司作为研究样本，根据腐败行为发现的可能性将上市公司高管腐败分为显性腐败和隐性腐败。实证研究发现：（1）对于显性腐败，高管高薪可以起到抑制腐败的作用，但是由于国有企业天生与政府存在亲属关系，这种抑制作用要弱于非国有企业；（2）对于隐性腐败，高薪并不能起到抑制腐败的功效，并且高管薪酬与隐性腐败存在正相关关系，支持了管理层权力理论。相对于国有企业，非国有企业高管薪酬与隐性腐败的正相关关系更为显著。
문장이2007-2012년 A 고상시공사작위연구양본，근거부패행위발현적가능성장상시공사고관부패분위현성부패화은성부패。실증연구발현：（1）대우현성부패，고관고신가이기도억제부패적작용，단시유우국유기업천생여정부존재친속관계，저충억제작용요약우비국유기업；（2）대우은성부패，고신병불능기도억제부패적공효，병차고관신수여은성부패존재정상관관계，지지료관리층권력이론。상대우국유기업，비국유기업고관신수여은성부패적정상관관계경위현저。
The paper uses a sample of A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2012 and classifies executive corruption into explicit corruption and implicit corruption according to the exposure possibility.It is found that:(1)For explicit corruption,high executive salary has suppressing effects.However,the suppressing effect is weaker for stated-owned enterprises than for private-owned enterprises because of the relationship between state-owned enterprises and the government.(2)For implicit corruption,high executive salary is unable to suppress corruption.A positive relationship exists between high executive salary and implicit cor-ruption,which supports the management power theory.In addition,the positive relationship is more promi-nent for private-owned enterprises than for state-owned enterprises.