CAJ | 학술논문

用不完全信息动态博弈模型对买卖中的“短斤少两”现象进行分析，按卖家是否作出“承诺”分别进行讨论，得到了相应的子博弈精练贝叶斯纳什均衡解的四个结论，这四个结论合理刻画了买卖双方的市场行为并揭示了“短斤少两”现象难以杜绝的原因。结果表明，诚信交易仅靠买卖双方的力量无法实现，还需要政府实施激励机制。
용불완전신식동태박혁모형대매매중적“단근소량”현상진행분석，안매가시부작출“승낙”분별진행토론，득도료상응적자박혁정련패협사납십균형해적사개결론，저사개결론합리각화료매매쌍방적시장행위병게시료“단근소량”현상난이두절적원인。결과표명，성신교역부고매매쌍방적역량무법실현，환수요정부실시격려궤제。
By using the incomplete information dynam ic game model,we analyze a cheating phenomenon in the trading transaction. We discuss this phenomenon respec tively basing on whether the seller gives a“commitment”,and then get four conclusions corresponding with the Sub-game Refined Bay Esian Nash Equilibrium. The four conclusions reasonably characterize the behavior of buyers and sellers in the market, and explain why it is difficult to stop the cheating phenomenon. The results show that the honesty transactions will not be able to be achieved only depending on the buyers and sellers,so incentive mechanism of government is necessary.