管理科学
管理科學
관이과학
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES IN CHINA
2013年
4期
46-59
,共14页
不公平厌恶偏好%薪酬契约%股权结构%实验分析
不公平厭噁偏好%薪酬契約%股權結構%實驗分析
불공평염악편호%신수계약%고권결구%실험분석
inequity aversion preference%compensation contract%ownership structure%experimental analysis
传统经济学理论建立在自利的人性假设之上，但事实上在许多情形下，公平意识会影响人的行为。以薪酬激励合约为中介，构建不同产权基础的公司与不同经理人员特质的内生配置模型，把不公平厌恶偏好的异质性纳入到配置模型中，以310位企业经理人员作为实验对象，通过一组独裁者博弈实验和两组策略博弈实验共9014次分配决策，检验被试几种主要类型的社会偏好，从中甄别出经理人员不公平厌恶偏好的相对强度，结合调查问卷的数据证实经理人员不公平厌恶偏好、努力水平、公司股权结构和公司绩效之间由薪酬激励契约联结起来的内生配置关系。研究结果表明，具有不同公平性偏好的行为人对于等额的薪酬不公平的反应有所不同，从而影响合约的履行效果，控制权收益对薪酬的浮动部分具有替代效应，产生反向的激励效应，替代程度越大，反向激励效果越大。
傳統經濟學理論建立在自利的人性假設之上，但事實上在許多情形下，公平意識會影響人的行為。以薪酬激勵閤約為中介，構建不同產權基礎的公司與不同經理人員特質的內生配置模型，把不公平厭噁偏好的異質性納入到配置模型中，以310位企業經理人員作為實驗對象，通過一組獨裁者博弈實驗和兩組策略博弈實驗共9014次分配決策，檢驗被試幾種主要類型的社會偏好，從中甄彆齣經理人員不公平厭噁偏好的相對彊度，結閤調查問捲的數據證實經理人員不公平厭噁偏好、努力水平、公司股權結構和公司績效之間由薪酬激勵契約聯結起來的內生配置關繫。研究結果錶明，具有不同公平性偏好的行為人對于等額的薪酬不公平的反應有所不同，從而影響閤約的履行效果，控製權收益對薪酬的浮動部分具有替代效應，產生反嚮的激勵效應，替代程度越大，反嚮激勵效果越大。
전통경제학이론건립재자리적인성가설지상，단사실상재허다정형하，공평의식회영향인적행위。이신수격려합약위중개，구건불동산권기출적공사여불동경리인원특질적내생배치모형，파불공평염악편호적이질성납입도배치모형중，이310위기업경리인원작위실험대상，통과일조독재자박혁실험화량조책략박혁실험공9014차분배결책，검험피시궤충주요류형적사회편호，종중견별출경리인원불공평염악편호적상대강도，결합조사문권적수거증실경리인원불공평염악편호、노력수평、공사고권결구화공사적효지간유신수격려계약련결기래적내생배치관계。연구결과표명，구유불동공평성편호적행위인대우등액적신수불공평적반응유소불동，종이영향합약적리행효과，공제권수익대신수적부동부분구유체대효응，산생반향적격려효응，체대정도월대，반향격려효과월대。
Traditional economic theory is built on the assumption of self-interest as the human nature , but in many cases , the sense of fairness also affects behaviors .Taking the compensation incentive contract as mediating factor , this paper constructs en-dogenous configuration models of companies with different property basis and variant managers ′traits, and the heterogeneity of in-equity aversion preference is fitted into the model .Taking 310 managers from enterprises as the research sample , the researchers conduct 9 014 allocation decisions through a game experiment on dictators and two strategy game experiments , test the main types of social preference , and distinguish intensities of inequity aversion preference of managers .Finally, with the data from survey questionnaires , this study proves the endogenous configuration relationship of the inequity aversion preference of managers , the level of efforts , the ownership structure and the firm performance connected by the compensation incentive contract .The results show that people with different levels of equity preference have various reactions on the same amount of compensation , thereby af-fecting the performance of the contract .The benefits of control can partially substitute the floating part of compensation , leading to a negative incentive effect .That is, the more the substitution is , the greater the negative incentive effects are .
