CAJ | 학술논문

本文研究CEO 变更前后公司盈余管理程度的变化，发现我国上市公司在CEO变更当年进行显著的负向盈余管理，调低利润；在变更次年进行正向盈余管理，调高利润，并进而恢复到变更前一年的水平；其中外部继任在继任当年的负向盈余管理程度更大，而在继任次年的正向盈余管理程度更大；并且来自大股东的外部继任与内部继任企业之间的盈余管理政策类似，但来自经理人市场的外部继任与内部继任企业之间的盈余管理政策有明显差异。
본문연구CEO 변경전후공사영여관리정도적변화，발현아국상시공사재CEO변경당년진행현저적부향영여관리，조저리윤；재변경차년진행정향영여관리，조고리윤，병진이회복도변경전일년적수평；기중외부계임재계임당년적부향영여관리정도경대，이재계임차년적정향영여관리정도경대；병차래자대고동적외부계임여내부계임기업지간적영여관리정책유사，단래자경리인시장적외부계임여내부계임기업지간적영여관리정책유명현차이。
This paper examines earnings management behavior of the listed A-Stock firms in Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period of CEO turnover .We find:(1)Earnings management exists during the year of CEO turnover and next year , and the firms of CEO turnover usually reduce profits through earnings management in the year of turnover , and then increase profit to meet the level of the previous year .(2)Compared to inside successors, outside successors make more negative earn-ings management in the year of turnover , while inside successors make more positive earnings management in the next year . (3) The policy of earnings management is similar between successors from major shareholders and from firm inside .However, the policy of earnings management is different between successors from manager market and from firm inside .