CAJ | 학술논문

在2012年第15届国际公钥密码学(PKC)年会上，Fujioka等人利用密钥封装机制(KEM)提出了认证密钥交换(AKE)协议的一个通用构造，称为GC协议，并在CK+模型下证明了该协议的安全性。该文对GC协议进行了安全性分析，指出该协议是不安全的，难于抵抗不知道任何秘密信息的外部攻击者实施的假冒攻击，进一步分析了原协议安全性证明中被疏忽之处。
재2012년제15계국제공약밀마학(PKC)년회상，Fujioka등인이용밀약봉장궤제(KEM)제출료인증밀약교환(AKE)협의적일개통용구조，칭위GC협의，병재CK+모형하증명료해협의적안전성。해문대GC협의진행료안전성분석，지출해협의시불안전적，난우저항불지도임하비밀신식적외부공격자실시적가모공격，진일보분석료원협의안전성증명중피소홀지처。
In the 15th (2012) IACR international conference on practice and theory of Public-Key Cryptography (PKC), Fujioka et al. proposed a generic construction of Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) from a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), which is called the GC protocol and is proven to be secure in the CK+security model. In this paper, it is pointed out by cryptanalysis that the GC protocol is not CK+secure. Concrete attacks in which the outside adversary, without knowing the static or ephemeral keys of the users, imitates a valid user are also given. Further, the errors in the original security proof are analyzed.