CAJ | 학술논문

在资源受限的机会网络中，节点在转发过程中所表现出的自私行为将严重影响网络性能。针对这一问题，建立基于认错机制的“礼尚往来”策略的节点重复博弈模型。节点考虑到将来的利益，迫于对惩罚的恐惧而参与转发。通过该策略，节点协作可以使网络性能达到最优。仿真结果表明，节点间的相互协作增强，在自私节点较多时也能保证较好的网络性能。
재자원수한적궤회망락중，절점재전발과정중소표현출적자사행위장엄중영향망락성능。침대저일문제，건립기우인착궤제적“례상왕래”책략적절점중복박혁모형。절점고필도장래적이익，박우대징벌적공구이삼여전발。통과해책략，절점협작가이사망락성능체도최우。방진결과표명，절점간적상호협작증강，재자사절점교다시야능보증교호적망락성능。
In opportunistic networks with limited resources, the performance of network is seriously affected by selfish behavior of the nodes during the packet forwarding. To solve this problem, the paper establishes a repeated-game model of node cooperation based on a admit mechanism of“Tit-For-Tat”strategy. The nodes consider the long-term interests and participate in forwarding forced by the fear of punishment. By using the strategy, cooperation of nodes in the network can make the network performance to achieve optimal. The simulation results show that the mutual cooperation of nodes is enhanced and the performance of the network can be guaranteed when more selfish nodes exist in network.