工业工程
工業工程
공업공정
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING JOURNAL
2014年
2期
92-98
,共7页
按订单装配供应链%零部件生产策略%零部件补货策略%讨价还价博弈
按訂單裝配供應鏈%零部件生產策略%零部件補貨策略%討價還價博弈
안정단장배공응련%령부건생산책략%령부건보화책략%토개환개박혁
assemble-to-order (ATO) supply chain%component production policy%component replenish-ment policy%bargaining game
通过建立ATO供应链中最终产品制造商与其两个供应商间的讨价还价合作模型,研究了ATO供应链的零部件生产补货策略和相应的利润分配策略,并探讨了供应链中各合作主体议价能力对最优解的影响。研究发现,ATO供应链应随着最终产品销售价格的提高而增加零部件产量,随最终产品组装成本或零部件生产成本的提高而减少零部件产量;随着最终产品制造商对其中一个供应商议价能力的增强,该供应商零部件的转移价格及其利润会降低,而另外一个供应商的零部件转移价格和利润会提高;若最终产品制造商比另外一个供应商的议价能力强,其期望利润会得到提高,反之,则会降低。
通過建立ATO供應鏈中最終產品製造商與其兩箇供應商間的討價還價閤作模型,研究瞭ATO供應鏈的零部件生產補貨策略和相應的利潤分配策略,併探討瞭供應鏈中各閤作主體議價能力對最優解的影響。研究髮現,ATO供應鏈應隨著最終產品銷售價格的提高而增加零部件產量,隨最終產品組裝成本或零部件生產成本的提高而減少零部件產量;隨著最終產品製造商對其中一箇供應商議價能力的增彊,該供應商零部件的轉移價格及其利潤會降低,而另外一箇供應商的零部件轉移價格和利潤會提高;若最終產品製造商比另外一箇供應商的議價能力彊,其期望利潤會得到提高,反之,則會降低。
통과건립ATO공응련중최종산품제조상여기량개공응상간적토개환개합작모형,연구료ATO공응련적령부건생산보화책략화상응적리윤분배책략,병탐토료공응련중각합작주체의개능력대최우해적영향。연구발현,ATO공응련응수착최종산품소수개격적제고이증가령부건산량,수최종산품조장성본혹령부건생산성본적제고이감소령부건산량;수착최종산품제조상대기중일개공응상의개능력적증강,해공응상령부건적전이개격급기리윤회강저,이령외일개공응상적령부건전이개격화리윤회제고;약최종산품제조상비령외일개공응상적의개능력강,기기망리윤회득도제고,반지,칙회강저。
A bargaining cooperative game model for assemble-to-order ( ATO) supply chain composed of a final product manufacturer and two suppliers is proposed to study the component production and replenish -ment policy and the corresponding profit-sharing policy .The effect of participant's bargaining power chain on the optimal solution is analyzed .It is found that ATO supply chain should raise the component produc-tion with the rise of the final product price , and reduce it with the rise of assembly cost of finished product or production cost of components .With the improvement of the bargaining power of final product manufac-turer to one supplier , the transfer price of components and profits of this supplier is reduced , while those of another supplier are increased at the same time .The expected profits of the final product manufacturer in-crease if its bargaining power is stronger than another supplier , and otherwise it reduces .