CAJ | 학술논문

为了保证排污治污政策的有效性和可操作性，为企业的排污和政府的监管提供合理化的建议和定量化的结果，文中以企业和政府在各种策略下的收益为出发点，建立了地区污染监管的博弈模型，给出了政府监管的最佳概率和企业排污的最佳概率，使博弈双方达到了混合策略纳什均衡。基于污染治理的博弈结果，对政府治污的监管流程进行了深入的研究和设计；当达到排污与监管的博弈均衡时，增收增产税和增收惩罚金的方式，对政府监管的概率影响不大，也就是相对稳定；而企业生产改变量差异较大，增收增产税法使企业具有更大的生产自主性。仿真示例结果表明，污染监管控制模型和流程设计是有效可行的，具有可操作性。
위료보증배오치오정책적유효성화가조작성，위기업적배오화정부적감관제공합이화적건의화정양화적결과，문중이기업화정부재각충책략하적수익위출발점，건립료지구오염감관적박혁모형，급출료정부감관적최가개솔화기업배오적최가개솔，사박혁쌍방체도료혼합책략납십균형。기우오염치리적박혁결과，대정부치오적감관류정진행료심입적연구화설계；당체도배오여감관적박혁균형시，증수증산세화증수징벌금적방식，대정부감관적개솔영향불대，야취시상대은정；이기업생산개변량차이교대，증수증산세법사기업구유경대적생산자주성。방진시례결과표명，오염감관공제모형화류정설계시유효가행적，구유가조작성。
To ensure the effectiveness and operability of the pollution control policy,and provide the rationalization recommendations and quantification of the results for sewage and regulators, establish a model game of regional pollution treatment and solution algorithm. Starting point to the enterprises and government's revenue in a variety of strategies,give the best probability of government regulation and enterprises sewage,making the game's two sides reached a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Based on the game results of pollution treatment,conducted in-depth research and design on the government to prevent water pollution monitoring mechanism. When reaching game equilibrium of sewage and supervision,the methods of increase yield taxes and income punishment gold,have little probability of impact of government regulation,which is relatively stable;and the amount of production change are quite different,the increase yield ta-xes has greater production autonomy than the income punishment gold to enterprises. Example of algorithms results show that pollution regulation's game model and mechanism design are feasible and effective,with operability.