CAJ | 학술논문

国有企业经营者道德风险产生的特殊之处在于国有企业中委托代理关系的链条过长，“所有者缺位”和“内部人控制”严重。通过分析国有企业经营者道德风险产生的原因，从法律的角度进行防范，首先是国有企业经营者任免上的去行政化；在激励方面，主要是完善以股票期权为主的中长期激励制度和精神激励制度；在监督方面，首先要解决的是信息不对称问题，然后是加强立法机关、行政机关和司法机关的监督，同时，还应该完善以董事会建设为主的企业治理结构。
국유기업경영자도덕풍험산생적특수지처재우국유기업중위탁대리관계적련조과장，“소유자결위”화“내부인공제”엄중。통과분석국유기업경영자도덕풍험산생적원인，종법률적각도진행방범，수선시국유기업경영자임면상적거행정화；재격려방면，주요시완선이고표기권위주적중장기격려제도화정신격려제도；재감독방면，수선요해결적시신식불대칭문제，연후시가강입법궤관、행정궤관화사법궤관적감독，동시，환응해완선이동사회건설위주적기업치리결구。
The chain of principal -agent relation in state-owned companies is too long , along with the absence of real owners and the problem of insider control which results in the moral hazard of operators in state -owned companies .This thesis tries to find the reasons and the measures to prevent .Deadministration in the appointment and removal of managers of the state -owned enterpri-ses and the incentive mechanism of stock options and spiritual motivation are regarded as two effective tools to solve the problem of information asymmetry .The important thing is to strengthen the supervisor for the administrative and judicial organs and perfect the management structure , which mostly rely on building a perfect board governing system .