财经论丛
財經論叢
재경론총
COLLECTED ESSAYS ON FINANCE AND ECONOMICS
2014年
1期
85-90
,共6页
转售价格维持%合谋效应%反垄断政策
轉售價格維持%閤謀效應%反壟斷政策
전수개격유지%합모효응%반롱단정책
resale price maintenance ( RPM)%collusion effects%antimonopoly enforcement
本文针对茅台、五粮液转售价格维持案，构建了转售价格维持促进合谋的理论模型，分析显示茅台、五粮液的最低转售价格维持具有承诺维持高价和促进合谋协议实施的效应。这是企业之间默契合谋的机制，应该受到《反垄断法》的禁止。中国最低转售价格维持的反垄断执法原则、效率抗辩配置、罚金水平确定依据等都需要改进。
本文針對茅檯、五糧液轉售價格維持案，構建瞭轉售價格維持促進閤謀的理論模型，分析顯示茅檯、五糧液的最低轉售價格維持具有承諾維持高價和促進閤謀協議實施的效應。這是企業之間默契閤謀的機製，應該受到《反壟斷法》的禁止。中國最低轉售價格維持的反壟斷執法原則、效率抗辯配置、罰金水平確定依據等都需要改進。
본문침대모태、오량액전수개격유지안，구건료전수개격유지촉진합모적이론모형，분석현시모태、오량액적최저전수개격유지구유승낙유지고개화촉진합모협의실시적효응。저시기업지간묵계합모적궤제，응해수도《반롱단법》적금지。중국최저전수개격유지적반롱단집법원칙、효솔항변배치、벌금수평학정의거등도수요개진。
Based on the RPM collusion model , we show that minimum resale price restriction practiced collectively by Moutai and Wuliangye is a mechanism to facilitate collusion .From the first antitrust case on resale price maintenance , we form the ideas that enforcement should confirm the rule of reason , offer firms opportunities to defend , ensure the basis of penalty level and strengthen the enforcement capacity of the antitrust agency .
