CAJ | 학술논문

对于军用定制软件，通常采用成本导向法进行定价。但是，现有方法在设置成本分担率这一参数时，没有考虑道德风险的影响，导致无法有效激励承包商降低成本。文章分析了军用软件采办中的委托代理关系，利用委托代理理论，分别在信息对称和信息不对称两种情况下，建立了军用软件的目标成本激励定价模型；通过模型的优化，确定了使军方期望效用最大化的成本分担率参数；最后给出了一个算例，并对相关参数变化对采办费用的影响情况进行了分析。实例分析表明，在信息不对称的条件下，可以通过在合同中引入激励机制，使承包商做出更大的努力，以达到控制采办费用的目的。
대우군용정제연건，통상채용성본도향법진행정개。단시，현유방법재설치성본분담솔저일삼수시，몰유고필도덕풍험적영향，도치무법유효격려승포상강저성본。문장분석료군용연건채판중적위탁대리관계，이용위탁대리이론，분별재신식대칭화신식불대칭량충정황하，건립료군용연건적목표성본격려정개모형；통과모형적우화，학정료사군방기망효용최대화적성본분담솔삼수；최후급출료일개산례，병대상관삼수변화대채판비용적영향정황진행료분석。실례분석표명，재신식불대칭적조건하，가이통과재합동중인입격려궤제，사승포상주출경대적노력，이체도공제채판비용적목적。
For customized software, the cost-oriented pricing method is usually used. However, when setting the cost sharing rate in existing method, the moral hazard is not considered, which lead to not effective prompting to the contractor to reduce the cost. In this paper, the principal-agent relationship in the acquisition of military software is analyzed. Using the principal-agent theory, target cost incentive pricing models under symmetric information and asymmetric information are given. The contract parameters are determined through model optimizing. Finally a calculation of a practical problem is illustrated and impacts of parameters' variety are analyzed. Results demonstrates that with asymmetric information, by introducing incentive mechanism, the defense industry enterprise would pay more effort to control the acquisition expenses.