CAJ | 학술논문

环境规制中企业、政府和环境规制机构三者之间的博弈关系是影响环境污染治理的重要因素。本文运用博弈论原理，分析了信息不对称下规制机构与企业合谋的可能与政府监管的必要，将环境规制划分为规制合约的设计与选择、执行与监管两个阶段，构建了多阶段的委托代理模型，考察了政府合约设计和监管、环境规制机构与企业合谋的因素，得到了环境规制中影响行为主体的关键政策变量，并提出了相应的政策建议。
배경규제중기업、정부화배경규제궤구삼자지간적박혁관계시영향배경오염치리적중요인소。본문운용박혁론원리，분석료신식불대칭하규제궤구여기업합모적가능여정부감관적필요，장배경규제화분위규제합약적설계여선택、집행여감관량개계단，구건료다계단적위탁대리모형，고찰료정부합약설계화감관、배경규제궤구여기업합모적인소，득도료배경규제중영향행위주체적관건정책변량，병제출료상응적정책건의。
The game relations are the important factors which affect pollution abatement among the enterprise , government and environmental regulatioin agency in pollution abatement .By game theory ,this paper analyzes the possibility of collusion between the enterprise and environmental regulatioin agency ,and the necessity of govern-ment supervision under the circumstance of asymmetric information .The paper also establishes multiple principal-agent model which includes the stage of contract design and supervision and the stage of collusion .Based on it , we get the key variables which affect the stakeholders ’ behaviros.Finally, the paper provides corresponding policies.