CAJ | 학술논문

本文构建了一个由供应商主导的二层供应链，供应商和零售商的双边努力行为决定产品最终的需求，尝试将公平偏好引入供应商的决策函数，研究公平偏好对双边努力行为的影响。研究结论表明：供应商和零售商二者的努力水平具有互补的特点；供应商的公平偏好与其努力水平间存在着正相关关系，而与零售商的努力水平间存在着负相关关系；供应商的公平偏好与供应链整体效用之间存在着正相关关系，供应链整体效用将随着供应商同情系数的增大而提高；当供应商的同情系数超过确定的临界值，供应链整体效用将高于不考虑供应商公平偏好时的情形。
본문구건료일개유공응상주도적이층공응련，공응상화령수상적쌍변노역행위결정산품최종적수구，상시장공평편호인입공응상적결책함수，연구공평편호대쌍변노역행위적영향。연구결론표명：공응상화령수상이자적노력수평구유호보적특점；공응상적공평편호여기노력수평간존재착정상관관계，이여령수상적노력수평간존재착부상관관계；공응상적공평편호여공응련정체효용지간존재착정상관관계，공응련정체효용장수착공응상동정계수적증대이제고；당공응상적동정계수초과학정적림계치，공응련정체효용장고우불고필공응상공평편호시적정형。
This paper focuses on a two-echelon supply chain dominated by supplier in which bilateral efforts of the players determine the product demand. We incorporate the concept of fairness into supplier’ s decision function and investigate how fairness may affect bilateral efforts. We demonstrate that efforts made by supplier and retailer are comple-mentary to each other. And positive correlation between fairness level and supplier’ s efforts is found while for retailer, the situation is opposite. Furthermore, the supply chain will experience a rise in the whole utility when supplier ’ s fairness level increases. We also find when supplier’ s fairness level exceeds a certain threshold value, the whole utility of the supply chain is higher than that of the supply chain without considering supplier’ s fairness.