CAJ | 학술논문

以2002～2011年716家上市公司为样本，运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法，同时考虑了三种内生性，研究了管理者薪酬、薪酬绩效敏感性与公司非效率投资间的关系。通过研究发现，提高管理者薪酬及其薪酬绩效敏感性不仅有利于降低公司的非效率投资行为，而且管理者薪酬与其薪酬绩效敏感性间的交互效应也对公司非效率投资有显著的影响。在降低公司的非效率投资方面，管理者薪酬与其绩效敏感性间存在互补效应。
이2002～2011년716가상시공사위양본，운용동태면판적System GMM고계방법，동시고필료삼충내생성，연구료관리자신수、신수적효민감성여공사비효솔투자간적관계。통과연구발현，제고관리자신수급기신수적효민감성불부유리우강저공사적비효솔투자행위，이차관리자신수여기신수적효민감성간적교호효응야대공사비효솔투자유현저적영향。재강저공사적비효솔투자방면，관리자신수여기적효민감성간존재호보효응。
In this paper, 716 listed companies range from 2002 to 2011 are used as our sample. We use the dynamic panel System GMM model,taking into account the three kinds of endogeneity at the same time, to study the relationship between managers salary, pay-performance sensitivity and corporate inefficient investment. And we find that, not only increasing managers salary and pay-performance sensitivity make a contribution to reducing corporate inefficient investment, but also the interaction effect between managers salary and pay-performance sensitivity has a significant effect on corporate inefficient investment. In terms of corporate inefficient investment, there is complementary effect between managers salary and pay-performance sensitivity.