管理科学
管理科學
관이과학
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES IN CHINA
2014年
3期
61-74
,共14页
CEO薪酬%企业业绩%薪酬粘性%薪酬业绩敏感性
CEO薪酬%企業業績%薪酬粘性%薪酬業績敏感性
CEO신수%기업업적%신수점성%신수업적민감성
CEO compensation%corporate performance%compensation stickiness%compensation-performance sensitivity
基于高管薪酬业绩选择性相关的观点,选取2005年至2012年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,运用固定效应面板数据多元回归分析模型和联立方程组模型,通过考察业绩提升和下降两种不同情形下薪酬与企业业绩之间是否存在显著的非对称性关系,对中国上市公司CEO薪酬粘性的存在性进行实证检验,并进一步探究CEO薪酬粘性的结构特征、行业特征和时变趋势。研究结果表明,①中国上市公司CEO薪酬存在典型的薪酬粘性现象,但这种粘性特征只在企业亏损较为严重的情况下显著存在,随着企业业绩的提升, CEO薪酬粘性程度逐渐减轻直至完全消失;②CEO薪酬粘性具有明显的行业差异性和显著的时变趋势,保护性行业上市公司CEO薪酬粘性更强而业绩敏感性更弱,并且这种偏离最优契约的薪酬粘性现象并未随时间演进而得到有效缓解,反而呈日益增强趋势。
基于高管薪酬業績選擇性相關的觀點,選取2005年至2012年中國A股上市公司為研究樣本,運用固定效應麵闆數據多元迴歸分析模型和聯立方程組模型,通過攷察業績提升和下降兩種不同情形下薪酬與企業業績之間是否存在顯著的非對稱性關繫,對中國上市公司CEO薪酬粘性的存在性進行實證檢驗,併進一步探究CEO薪酬粘性的結構特徵、行業特徵和時變趨勢。研究結果錶明,①中國上市公司CEO薪酬存在典型的薪酬粘性現象,但這種粘性特徵隻在企業虧損較為嚴重的情況下顯著存在,隨著企業業績的提升, CEO薪酬粘性程度逐漸減輕直至完全消失;②CEO薪酬粘性具有明顯的行業差異性和顯著的時變趨勢,保護性行業上市公司CEO薪酬粘性更彊而業績敏感性更弱,併且這種偏離最優契約的薪酬粘性現象併未隨時間縯進而得到有效緩解,反而呈日益增彊趨勢。
기우고관신수업적선택성상관적관점,선취2005년지2012년중국A고상시공사위연구양본,운용고정효응면판수거다원회귀분석모형화련립방정조모형,통과고찰업적제승화하강량충불동정형하신수여기업업적지간시부존재현저적비대칭성관계,대중국상시공사CEO신수점성적존재성진행실증검험,병진일보탐구CEO신수점성적결구특정、행업특정화시변추세。연구결과표명,①중국상시공사CEO신수존재전형적신수점성현상,단저충점성특정지재기업우손교위엄중적정황하현저존재,수착기업업적적제승, CEO신수점성정도축점감경직지완전소실;②CEO신수점성구유명현적행업차이성화현저적시변추세,보호성행업상시공사CEO신수점성경강이업적민감성경약,병차저충편리최우계약적신수점성현상병미수시간연진이득도유효완해,반이정일익증강추세。
Based on the new perspectives of selective relationship between executive compensation and firm performance , this pa-per empirically tested the existence of the stickiness of CEO compensation and further analyzes its structural feature , industrial feature, time-varying trend and countermeasures .Using data from Chinese listed companies during 2005 to 2012 as samples, this paper applied fixed-effect panel data multivariate regression model and simultaneous equations model to verify the existence of asymmetric relations between compensation and corporate performance .The result shows that:①the stickiness of CEO compen-sation exists, but it only exists in companies which has serious losses , and it will gradually decrease and disappear with the im-provement of performance; and ② the compensation stickiness varies significantly between industries and keeps time -varying trend, the protective industries have less compensation-performance sensitivity but more CEO compensation stickiness in compari-son with competitive industries , and the compensation stickiness , which deviate optimal contracts , not only has not been effec-tively suppressed as time goes , but also has gradually increased .