CAJ | 학술논문

鉴于电力供求集中度的不对称性以及我国电力能源供不应求的局面，将发电侧与用电侧放在同一市场内竞争可能导致生产者剩余远大于消费者剩余。在供需双方直接交易的情况下，将会有许多用户因电价过高而无电可用。由于用电侧市场直接关乎国计民生，因此迫切需要研究适用于我国电力市场改革的用电侧竞价机制。放弃了电力市场中“价高者得，价低者出局”这一传统结算方式，提出了一种兼顾效率与公平的用电侧市场竞价机制。这种机制按用户报价比例，并参考用户的意愿电量实现市场出清。基于此，提出了相应的数学模型。针对该非线性混合整数规划模型，通过引入辅助变量，实现了模型的线性化，从而能够采用成熟的数学商业软件高效求解。还提出了评价竞价机制公平性的相应指标。经算例验证，与传统竞价机制相比，文中的方法在牺牲较少效率的同时，确保了用电侧的公平性，同时能够抑制非理性的竞争。
감우전력공구집중도적불대칭성이급아국전력능원공불응구적국면，장발전측여용전측방재동일시장내경쟁가능도치생산자잉여원대우소비자잉여。재공수쌍방직접교역적정황하，장회유허다용호인전개과고이무전가용。유우용전측시장직접관호국계민생，인차박절수요연구괄용우아국전력시장개혁적용전측경개궤제。방기료전력시장중“개고자득，개저자출국”저일전통결산방식，제출료일충겸고효솔여공평적용전측시장경개궤제。저충궤제안용호보개비례，병삼고용호적의원전량실현시장출청。기우차，제출료상응적수학모형。침대해비선성혼합정수규화모형，통과인입보조변량，실현료모형적선성화，종이능구채용성숙적수학상업연건고효구해。환제출료평개경개궤제공평성적상응지표。경산례험증，여전통경개궤제상비，문중적방법재희생교소효솔적동시，학보료용전측적공평성，동시능구억제비이성적경쟁。
In view of the concentration asymmetry between power supply and power demand and the phase of short of demand of electrical energy in China, putting the generation side and demand side within a same market to complete may lead to the result that the producer surplus is much greater than the consumer surplus. Under the circumstance of direct trade between the supply side and demand side, many users may have no power to purchase due to the too high price. Since the demand-side market is closely linked with national economy and people's livelihood, it is necessary to design a bidding mechanism for demand side that is suitable for the electricity market reform in China, thus the traditional settlement mode of“the users bidding higher prices won while the users bidding lower prices are out” is abandoned, and a bidding mechanism for demand-side market considering both efficiency and fairness is proposed. In the proposed bidding mechanism, the market clearing is implemented according to the proportions of user’s bidding prices and referring to the willing demand of consumers. On this basis, a corresponding mathematical model, which is a nonlinear mixed integer-programming model, is given, and by means of leading in an auxiliary variable the linearization of the given model is implemented, thus this model can be solved efficiently by matured mathematical commercial solvers. In addition, an indicator to assess the fairness of the proposed bidding mechanism is put forward. As is verified in case studies, the new mechanism only sacrifices a little efficiency compared with the traditional one while the fairness of the demand side is ensured. And irrational competition can be restrained.