四川师范大学学报(社会科学版)
四川師範大學學報(社會科學版)
사천사범대학학보(사회과학판)
JOURNAL OF SICHUAN NORMAL UNIVERSITY(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION)
2014年
2期
39-44
,共6页
先驱者利润%地方政府%公共服务创新%产权%选择性激励机制
先驅者利潤%地方政府%公共服務創新%產權%選擇性激勵機製
선구자리윤%지방정부%공공복무창신%산권%선택성격려궤제
promoter’s profit%local government%public service innovation%property rights%selec-tive incentive mechanism
由于缺乏经济利润诱发的竞争刺激,“政治企业家”的选择性激励机制构建对于公共服务创新是相对更为重要的。“先驱者利润”驱动的创新机制有四个关键要素,即创新型企业家、“企业家利润机会”、可供企业家支配资源的存在、以及良好的创新产权保护制度。未来的国家政治机制设计,一要明确政治晋升作为“先驱者利润”的激励机制,以强化竞争刺激;二要调整官员绩效考核标准,加快实现从“经济绩效”到“社会绩效”指标的转移,以实现激励与政治目标的统一;三要通过制度化的中央巡视制度和居民主观评价及时认定已发生的地方政府公共服务创新行为,并将之与地方官员职务晋升相挂钩,以有效保护政治创新产权。
由于缺乏經濟利潤誘髮的競爭刺激,“政治企業傢”的選擇性激勵機製構建對于公共服務創新是相對更為重要的。“先驅者利潤”驅動的創新機製有四箇關鍵要素,即創新型企業傢、“企業傢利潤機會”、可供企業傢支配資源的存在、以及良好的創新產權保護製度。未來的國傢政治機製設計,一要明確政治晉升作為“先驅者利潤”的激勵機製,以彊化競爭刺激;二要調整官員績效攷覈標準,加快實現從“經濟績效”到“社會績效”指標的轉移,以實現激勵與政治目標的統一;三要通過製度化的中央巡視製度和居民主觀評價及時認定已髮生的地方政府公共服務創新行為,併將之與地方官員職務晉升相掛鉤,以有效保護政治創新產權。
유우결핍경제리윤유발적경쟁자격,“정치기업가”적선택성격려궤제구건대우공공복무창신시상대경위중요적。“선구자리윤”구동적창신궤제유사개관건요소,즉창신형기업가、“기업가리윤궤회”、가공기업가지배자원적존재、이급량호적창신산권보호제도。미래적국가정치궤제설계,일요명학정치진승작위“선구자리윤”적격려궤제,이강화경쟁자격;이요조정관원적효고핵표준,가쾌실현종“경제적효”도“사회적효”지표적전이,이실현격려여정치목표적통일;삼요통과제도화적중앙순시제도화거민주관평개급시인정이발생적지방정부공공복무창신행위,병장지여지방관원직무진승상괘구,이유효보호정치창신산권。
Due to the lack of competitive incentive induced by economic profit, constructing a kind of selective incentive mechanism directed to“political entrepreneur” is essential to public service innova-tion. Innovation mechanism, which was induced by promoter’s profit, is consist of four elements, i.e., the innovative entrepreneur, profit taken opportunity, resources and power available, and property right protection. In the process of national political mechanism design, firstly, the political incentive mecha-nism of official promotions needs to be confirmed as a kind of promoter’ s profit so as to strengthen com-petition among local officials. Secondly, official performance assessment system should be improved to ac-celerate the process of transition from economic performance to social performance, so as to reach the conformity between stimulus and political goals. Thirdly, through central government’ s inspection system and residents’ subjective evaluation method, existed local government public service innovation behavior should be timely confirmed, and the innovation behavior with official’ s promotion should be connected, and property rights of public service innovation can thus be protected.