CAJ | 학술논문

流域环境的整体性和系统性与流域环境政策的跨区域性之间的矛盾使得流域环境政策在区域合作中难以起到应有的作用。本文从环境政策所涉及的各方利益互动的角度，运用博弈论和利益相关者理论，以太湖地区的流域环境政策为例，通过分析中央政府与地方政府以及地方政府间在环境政策制定和实施过程中的博弈过程来探讨流域环境保护的利益驱动机制，并依据其分析结果提出相关政策建议。
류역배경적정체성화계통성여류역배경정책적과구역성지간적모순사득류역배경정책재구역합작중난이기도응유적작용。본문종배경정책소섭급적각방이익호동적각도，운용박혁론화이익상관자이론，이태호지구적류역배경정책위례，통과분석중앙정부여지방정부이급지방정부간재배경정책제정화실시과정중적박혁과정래탐토류역배경보호적이익구동궤제，병의거기분석결과제출상관정책건의。
The contradictions between the entirety and systematicness of basin environment and the cross-region of basin environment policies make it difficult for basin environment policies to play roles in regional cooperation. This paper, from the view of the interests interaction of all parties which the basin environment policies concern,based on game theory and stakeholder theory, taking the basin environment policies of Tai Lake as an example, through the analysis of the game process of making and implementing the environmen-tal policies between the central and local governments and between local governments, explores the interests driving mechanism of the basin environment protection, then it puts forward some relevant policy suggestions on the basis of the analysis results.