CAJ | 학술논문

针对频繁发生的产品质量问题，以政府产品质量监管为出发点，基于博弈理论，构建了政府与生产企业的纯策略博弈模型、混合策略博弈模型。分析了监管过程中存在的漏洞及不足，研究了政府与生产企业间的博弈关系及策略选择；探究了政府对企业实施监管过程中的影响因素，证明了政府监管的有效性取决于对违规企业的惩罚力度、企业生产劣质产品而获得的额外预期收益、政府监督支付的成本。最后给出政府加强产品质量管理的建议及生产企业提高产品质量的措施。
침대빈번발생적산품질량문제，이정부산품질량감관위출발점，기우박혁이론，구건료정부여생산기업적순책략박혁모형、혼합책략박혁모형。분석료감관과정중존재적루동급불족，연구료정부여생산기업간적박혁관계급책략선택；탐구료정부대기업실시감관과정중적영향인소，증명료정부감관적유효성취결우대위규기업적징벌력도、기업생산렬질산품이획득적액외예기수익、정부감독지부적성본。최후급출정부가강산품질량관리적건의급생산기업제고산품질량적조시。
With the frequent occurrence of product accidents , the pure strategy and the mixed strategy game model of the government and the enterprise were constructed based on game theory , using the product quality supervision of the government as the starting point .This paper analyzed some deficiencies and the influencing factors in the process of supervision , studied the game relationship and strategies between the government and the enterprise . It proved that the effectiveness of government regulation depended on the punishment for the illegal enterprises ,the expected benefits of inferior products and the cost of supervision .In the end ,we provided some advice for the government on how to supervise effectively and for the enterprise on how to improve the products quality level .