CAJ | 학술논문

针对由单一制造商、单一零售商和单一第三方组成的闭环供应链，利用Stackelberg博弈，研究了分散决策下基于补贴、碳税、补贴和碳税的奖惩机制决策的闭环供应链定价策略。结果表明，基于补贴和碳税的奖惩机制决策更能有效降低闭环供应链碳排放量、提高回收率。通过数值算例验证了基于补贴和碳税的奖惩机制的有效性。
침대유단일제조상、단일령수상화단일제삼방조성적폐배공응련，이용Stackelberg박혁，연구료분산결책하기우보첩、탄세、보첩화탄세적장징궤제결책적폐배공응련정개책략。결과표명，기우보첩화탄세적장징궤제결책경능유효강저폐배공응련탄배방량、제고회수솔。통과수치산례험증료기우보첩화탄세적장징궤제적유효성。
A closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of a manufacturer , a retailer, and a third-party is addressed in this paper .The supply chain is governed by the premium and penalty mechanism which is composed of subsidization or carbon taxation or subsidization and carbon taxation .The Stackelberg game theory is used to study the pricing strategy for such a supply chain under decentralized decision .The re-sults show that premium and penalty mechanism based on subsidization and carbon taxation can effectively reduce not only the carbon emissions , but also enhance collection rate .By using numerical examples , the effectiveness of the premium and penalty mechanism based on subsidization and carbon taxation is valida -ted.