CAJ | 학술논문

地方财政支出占全国财政支出的比例在过去20年里不仅没有减少，反而呈现缓慢增长趋势，这说明分税制改革并没有导致地方财权的减小，也不是地方债务膨胀的主要原因。地方债务膨胀的根本原因在于地方政府主导经济发展的模式以及地方政府官员的“经济人”行为，包括政绩考核下的投资冲动、上级政府监督中的利益共容以及官员的寻租行为。
지방재정지출점전국재정지출적비례재과거20년리불부몰유감소，반이정현완만증장추세，저설명분세제개혁병몰유도치지방재권적감소，야불시지방채무팽창적주요원인。지방채무팽창적근본원인재우지방정부주도경제발전적모식이급지방정부관원적“경제인”행위，포괄정적고핵하적투자충동、상급정부감독중적이익공용이급관원적심조행위。
The proportion of local fiscal expenditure to national fiscal expenditure did not decrease in the past 20 years, but show slow growth instead, which indicates that the reform of tax system does not lead to the reduction of the local authority, and it isn′t the main reason for the local debt expansion. The fundamental reason for the local debt expansion lies in the model of local-government-dominated economic development. Besides, local gov-ernment officials acting as ″economic man″, impulsive investments under the pressure of performance appraisal, common interests within the superior government oversight, and rent-seeking behavior of officials in the economic field together contribute to the expansion of local debts.