CAJ | 학술논문

研究了一个制造商、两个零售商和一个第三方物流企业组成的再制造闭环供应链系统。对各方分别领导 Stackelberg 博弈时的闭环供应链的销售量、批发价、回收率及各方的利润值进行计算，对结果进行深入分析。结果表明：当制造商或者零售商为博弈的领导者时，另两方跟随决策的顺序不同对博弈结果无影响；第三方物流企业领导博弈时，其利润值却因其他两方跟随决策的顺序不同出现双向极端化的结果；对于其中第三方物流企业利润最低的情况(3RM市场结构)，可以考虑采用分散-集中相结合的市场结构来提高其利润；最后给出了各方策略图。
연구료일개제조상、량개령수상화일개제삼방물류기업조성적재제조폐배공응련계통。대각방분별령도 Stackelberg 박혁시적폐배공응련적소수량、비발개、회수솔급각방적리윤치진행계산，대결과진행심입분석。결과표명：당제조상혹자령수상위박혁적령도자시，령량방근수결책적순서불동대박혁결과무영향；제삼방물류기업령도박혁시，기리윤치각인기타량방근수결책적순서불동출현쌍향겁단화적결과；대우기중제삼방물류기업리윤최저적정황(3RM시장결구)，가이고필채용분산-집중상결합적시장결구래제고기리윤；최후급출료각방책략도。
A closed-loop supply chain system composed of a manufacturer,two retailers and a third-party collector have been researched in this paper.Sales,wholesale price,recovery rates and the value of all profits are calculated and compared under the different leadership of the main body in the closed-loop supply chain,and then the compared results are analyzed in-depth.The results showed that under the condition of the leadership by the manufacturer or the retailer in supply chain,the subsequence of the dif-ferent party had no effect on the game results.While the leadership is third-party recyclers and the subse-quent decision-making body is different,the value of third-party recyclers'profit appeared to be extreme. Studies show that the third-party recyclers acquire high profits and high recovery rate by collapsing the retailer's commonwealth.Finally,Strategy Figure is given.