CAJ | 학술논문

研究目的：探讨土地督察员与开发商囤地的博弈行为及其管制策略。研究方法：演化博弈论方法。研究结果：构建了土地督察员与开发商囤地的演化博弈模型，论证了不同情景下土地督察员与开发商囤地博弈的演化稳定策略及其演化趋势。研究结论：在房地产开发领域的土地利用管制上，既要合理引导开发商等主体的市场行为，还要约束地方政府、土地督察机构等“监管者”的督察行为，构建开发商与土地督察员互动的土地利用管制机制，提高土地督察制度绩效。
연구목적：탐토토지독찰원여개발상돈지적박혁행위급기관제책략。연구방법：연화박혁론방법。연구결과：구건료토지독찰원여개발상돈지적연화박혁모형，론증료불동정경하토지독찰원여개발상돈지박혁적연화은정책략급기연화추세。연구결론：재방지산개발영역적토지이용관제상，기요합리인도개발상등주체적시장행위，환요약속지방정부、토지독찰궤구등“감관자”적독찰행위，구건개발상여토지독찰원호동적토지이용관제궤제，제고토지독찰제도적효。
The purpose of this paper is to explore the behaviors mechanism of illegal land reservation by real estate developers and the state land supervision in China. Evolutionary game theory is introduced to probe into this problem. This paper argued that there are conflicts between land supervisor and real estate developers. In order to explore their strategies of evolution, this paper built an evolutionary game model of the real estate developers and land inspectors. The evolutionary stable strategies in different scenarios were proved through the analysis of the replicated dynamic equation between land supervisor and real estate developers. The recommend regulations were put forward in the end of the paper. The regulations of land use in the field of real estate, not only should guide the market behavior of real estate developers reasonably, but also should restrain the supervision behavior of the regulators. In order to improve the achievement of the land supervision system, it is necessary to build an interaction regulation model between the real estate developers and the land supervisors in China.