CAJ | 학술논문

本文以2002-2011年716家上市公司为样本，在动态内生性框架下，运用动态面板System GMM估计方法，在考虑了高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的交互作用情况下，研究了高管薪酬与公司绩效间的动态关系。研究结果表明：（1）前期高管持股比例与公司绩效呈负相关，前期高管货币薪酬与公司绩效呈正相关；（2）前期公司绩效对高管薪酬产生了显著的反馈效应；（3）高管薪酬与其他公司治理机制间存在“交互效应”，即高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的相互作用对公司绩效产生了显著的影响；（4）高管薪酬与公司绩效间存在动态内生性。
본문이2002-2011년716가상시공사위양본，재동태내생성광가하，운용동태면판System GMM고계방법，재고필료고관신수여기타치리궤제간적교호작용정황하，연구료고관신수여공사적효간적동태관계。연구결과표명：（1）전기고관지고비례여공사적효정부상관，전기고관화폐신수여공사적효정정상관；（2）전기공사적효대고관신수산생료현저적반궤효응；（3）고관신수여기타공사치리궤제간존재“교호효응”，즉고관신수여기타치리궤제간적상호작용대공사적효산생료현저적영향；（4）고관신수여공사적효간존재동태내생성。
In this paper, 716 companies listed from 2002 to 2011 are used as the sample. Under the dynamic en-dogenous framework, applying the dynamic system GMM mode,accounting for the interaction effect between execu-tive compensation and the other governance mechanism,the paper studies the dynamic relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. The results are as follows. Firstly, the shareholding ratio of ex-executives has a negative relation with corporate performance, while the monetary compensation of ex-executives has a positive relation with corporate performance. Secondly,the previous corporate performance has a significant feedback effect on executive compensation. Thirdly,the interaction effect between executive compensation and the other corporate gover-nance mechanisms really exists, that is to say, the interaction between executive compensation and the other corpo-rate governance mechanisms has a significant impact on corporate performance. Fourthly,there does exist dynamic en-dogeneity between executive compensation and corporate performance.