技术经济与管理研究
技術經濟與管理研究
기술경제여관리연구
TECHNOECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
2014年
5期
3-7
,共5页
商业信用%经济批量%收益共享%供应链管理
商業信用%經濟批量%收益共享%供應鏈管理
상업신용%경제비량%수익공향%공응련관리
Commercial credit%Economic quantity%Revenue sharing%Supply chain management
文章基于供应商提供的不同商业信用策略假设,研究了由单一供应商和单一零售商构成的二级供应链中的联合批量决策问题。文章在对现有文献进行分析和梳理的基础上,将商业信用期长度作为决策变量,并考虑每循环周期供应商可能按照零售商订货量的整数倍放大采购的情形,构建出供应商不同商业信用策略下供应商和零售商的最优批量决策模型和供应链综合成本决策模型,并给出了供应链成本节约的收益分配方案。结果表明,与不提供商业信用激励相比,供应商提供商业信用激励时零售商的订购批量会更高,供应链的综合成本也更低。考虑到供应链联合决策中可能出现的收益不均衡问题,文章提出针对供应链协同带来的成本节约,按供应商与零售商投入存货成本比例进行分配的收益共享决策方案。最后,文章通过算例验证了模型和算法的有效性。
文章基于供應商提供的不同商業信用策略假設,研究瞭由單一供應商和單一零售商構成的二級供應鏈中的聯閤批量決策問題。文章在對現有文獻進行分析和梳理的基礎上,將商業信用期長度作為決策變量,併攷慮每循環週期供應商可能按照零售商訂貨量的整數倍放大採購的情形,構建齣供應商不同商業信用策略下供應商和零售商的最優批量決策模型和供應鏈綜閤成本決策模型,併給齣瞭供應鏈成本節約的收益分配方案。結果錶明,與不提供商業信用激勵相比,供應商提供商業信用激勵時零售商的訂購批量會更高,供應鏈的綜閤成本也更低。攷慮到供應鏈聯閤決策中可能齣現的收益不均衡問題,文章提齣針對供應鏈協同帶來的成本節約,按供應商與零售商投入存貨成本比例進行分配的收益共享決策方案。最後,文章通過算例驗證瞭模型和算法的有效性。
문장기우공응상제공적불동상업신용책략가설,연구료유단일공응상화단일령수상구성적이급공응련중적연합비량결책문제。문장재대현유문헌진행분석화소리적기출상,장상업신용기장도작위결책변량,병고필매순배주기공응상가능안조령수상정화량적정수배방대채구적정형,구건출공응상불동상업신용책략하공응상화령수상적최우비량결책모형화공응련종합성본결책모형,병급출료공응련성본절약적수익분배방안。결과표명,여불제공상업신용격려상비,공응상제공상업신용격려시령수상적정구비량회경고,공응련적종합성본야경저。고필도공응련연합결책중가능출현적수익불균형문제,문장제출침대공응련협동대래적성본절약,안공응상여령수상투입존화성본비례진행분배적수익공향결책방안。최후,문장통과산례험증료모형화산법적유효성。
Commercial credit, economic quantity, revenue sharing, supply chain management. Based on different commercial credit strategy assumes provided by supplier, this paper study joint lot decision problem in two-level supply chain consist of a single supplier and a single retailer. On the basis of analysis of existing literature and sort, we think length of the commercial credit as decision variables and consider the circumstances that suppliers may enlarge procurement as an integer multiple by order quantity of retailers in each cycle. Thus, we construct optimal lot decision model under different strategies of suppliers and integrated cost model of supply chain. In addition, we provide income distribution program about cost savings in supply chain. The results show that order quantities of retailers will be higher and the overall cost of the supply chain will be lower when suppliers provide incentives of commercial credit, compared with the case that suppliers don't provide incentives of commercial credit. Finally, some numerical examples are used to illustrate the results obtained in this paper.