CAJ | 학술논문

针对逆向供应链成员企业库存容量有限的问题，构建了由制造商和回收商构成的二级逆向供应链模型。综合考虑制造商再制造率、回收商努力程度和政府奖惩补贴等因素，分别讨论了 Stackel-berg博弈和集中式决策下双方的决策行为，其中 Stackelberg 博弈考虑制造商和回收商分别租用第三方库存两种情况。通过算例分析了决策变量和第三方库存设施对逆向供应链各企业收益的影响。研究结果表明：在第三方库存条件一定时，集中式决策优于 Stackelberg 博弈；在分散式决策下，与回收商负责租用第三方库存相比，制造商租用第三方库存可使各方决策更优，并能使供应链整体效益更高。
침대역향공응련성원기업고존용량유한적문제，구건료유제조상화회수상구성적이급역향공응련모형。종합고필제조상재제조솔、회수상노력정도화정부장징보첩등인소，분별토론료 Stackel-berg박혁화집중식결책하쌍방적결책행위，기중 Stackelberg 박혁고필제조상화회수상분별조용제삼방고존량충정황。통과산례분석료결책변량화제삼방고존설시대역향공응련각기업수익적영향。연구결과표명：재제삼방고존조건일정시，집중식결책우우 Stackelberg 박혁；재분산식결책하，여회수상부책조용제삼방고존상비，제조상조용제삼방고존가사각방결책경우，병능사공응련정체효익경고。
A two-echelon RSC system containing a manufacturer and a recycler was established with considering the factors of remanufacturing rate,collection effort and subsidies when facing the limitation of inventory capacity.For the two cases that the manufacturer or the recycler rented a facili-ty,the optimal decision-making was analyzed under Stackelberg game and centralized decision in RSC. The relationships between the members'expected profits and various parameters as well as third-par-ty facility were discussed by numerical simulations.The results indicate that the system benefit under centralized decision is optimal compared with Stackelberg game,and it can obtain better decisions as well as the system benefit when the manufacturer rents the facility instead of the recycler.