CAJ | 학술논문

引入零售商风险规避偏好，在努力水平影响需求的两种模式下，分别建立了销售回馈与惩罚契约模型。随后，探讨了单纯的销售回馈与惩罚契约能否实现供应链协调，以及协调时各契约参数满足的条件。最后，通过数值分析对契约的协调性进行进一步分析。
인입령수상풍험규피편호，재노력수평영향수구적량충모식하，분별건립료소수회궤여징벌계약모형。수후，탐토료단순적소수회궤여징벌계약능부실현공응련협조，이급협조시각계약삼수만족적조건。최후，통과수치분석대계약적협조성진행진일보분석。
This paper introduces the retailer ’ s risk aversion in a two stage supply chain .Under both the additive and multiplicative sales effort dependent demands , the issue of supply chain coordination and optimization with risk-averse retailer and sales effort sensitive demand under a single sales rebate and penalty contract is explored . Besides, the optimal conditions that the contract parameters must satisfy in order to achieve supply chain coordi -nation are determined .Numerical analysis is presented to further illustrate the role of sales rebate and penalty contract.