CAJ | 학술논문

研究了在专利完善市场受专利保护的原制造商面对再制造商竞争所采取得两种策略：无许可再制造与许可再制造。在再制造成本差异及消费者异质的情况下，分别建立了无回收数量限制的单周期模型和受回收数量限制的两周期模型，利用博弈理论求解原制造商和再制造商竞争情况下的最优决策。通过比较分析和数值仿真，讨论了不同参数对新产品和再制造品定价策略及双方利润的影响，并给出了相关结论。结果表明，原制造商倾向于采用许可再制造策略，这是在于原制造商可以通过收取专利许可费来分享再制造所带来的收益；而对再制造商而言，只有许可再制造所带来的节省成本足够高时，才有意愿接受原制造商的专利技术支持。
연구료재전리완선시장수전리보호적원제조상면대재제조상경쟁소채취득량충책략：무허가재제조여허가재제조。재재제조성본차이급소비자이질적정황하，분별건립료무회수수량한제적단주기모형화수회수수량한제적량주기모형，이용박혁이론구해원제조상화재제조상경쟁정황하적최우결책。통과비교분석화수치방진，토론료불동삼수대신산품화재제조품정개책략급쌍방리윤적영향，병급출료상관결론。결과표명，원제조상경향우채용허가재제조책략，저시재우원제조상가이통과수취전리허가비래분향재제조소대래적수익；이대재제조상이언，지유허가재제조소대래적절성성본족구고시，재유의원접수원제조상적전리기술지지。
In the patent perfect market , the original manufacturer by the patent protection can adopt two strate-gies:no license remanufacturing and license remanufacturing .Based on the remanufacturing cost difference and consumer heterogeneous , this paper establishes the single period model without recovery number limit and two period model with recovery number limit respectively .The optimal decision and equilibrium profit are given by using game theory .Through the comparative analysis and numerical simulation , the paper discusses the effect of different parameters on pricing strategy and the profit .The results show that the original manufacturer can share remanufacturing benefit through patent licensing fee in the case of license remanufacturing , so the original manu-facturer is willing to adopt the strategy of manufacturer license; only when the cost savings is high enough in license remanufacturing , the remanufacturer will receive the patent licensing of the original manufacturer .