CAJ | 학술논문

运用“囚徒困境”模型分析了“价格战”现象的无休止进行的成因，同时利用改进后的Bertrand模型从数量、价格、利润方面深入讨论了此现象对厂商和消费者福利的影响；最后结合微观经济学和政治经济学的竞争理论为政府与厂商提供了相关建议；为了使商品市场健康可持续发展，政府应该控制“参战”厂家数量，同时企业应该树立自己的品牌。
운용“수도곤경”모형분석료“개격전”현상적무휴지진행적성인，동시이용개진후적Bertrand모형종수량、개격、리윤방면심입토론료차현상대엄상화소비자복리적영향；최후결합미관경제학화정치경제학적경쟁이론위정부여엄상제공료상관건의；위료사상품시장건강가지속발전，정부응해공제“삼전”엄가수량，동시기업응해수립자기적품패。
Through the model of prisoner＇ s dilemma, we conduct the corresponding analysis of the cause of the endless price war phenomenon . In terms of output, price and profit, the impact of this phenomenon on the welfare of both companies and customers is deeply discussed using the improved Bertrand gambling model. From these conclusions and the competition theory in both microeconomics and political economy, we offer some suggestions for governments and companies. In order to ensure the healthy and sustainable development of commodity market, governments should control the numbers of companies in＂ price war＂ and meanwhile companies themselves should build their own brands