合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版)
閤肥工業大學學報(自然科學版)
합비공업대학학보(자연과학판)
JOURNAL OF HEFEI UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY(NATURAL SCIENCE)
2014年
2期
232-237
,共6页
演化博弈%产业共生%复制动态方程%演化稳定策略
縯化博弈%產業共生%複製動態方程%縯化穩定策略
연화박혁%산업공생%복제동태방정%연화은정책략
evolutionary game%industrial commensalism%replicator dynamic equation%evolutionary stable strategy
文章运用演化博弈的思想,以产业生态系统中存在共生关系的企业群体为博弈主体,构建机会主义和惩罚机制2种情形下博弈主体的支付矩阵;以企业与监管方为博弈主体,构建不同策略下参与主体双方的支付矩阵;建立相应的复制动态方程,寻求演化稳定策略,通过分析得出影响因素对产业共生行为策略演化初始状态的作用机理。
文章運用縯化博弈的思想,以產業生態繫統中存在共生關繫的企業群體為博弈主體,構建機會主義和懲罰機製2種情形下博弈主體的支付矩陣;以企業與鑑管方為博弈主體,構建不同策略下參與主體雙方的支付矩陣;建立相應的複製動態方程,尋求縯化穩定策略,通過分析得齣影響因素對產業共生行為策略縯化初始狀態的作用機理。
문장운용연화박혁적사상,이산업생태계통중존재공생관계적기업군체위박혁주체,구건궤회주의화징벌궤제2충정형하박혁주체적지부구진;이기업여감관방위박혁주체,구건불동책략하삼여주체쌍방적지부구진;건립상응적복제동태방정,심구연화은정책략,통과분석득출영향인소대산업공생행위책략연화초시상태적작용궤리。
Based on the approach of evolutionary game ,taking the enterprise groups in the industrial e-cosystem w hich are in a relationship of commensalism as game subjects ,the payment functions of the main parties involved under opportunism and punishment mechanism are proposed .Taking the enter-prise and supervisor as game subjects ,the payment function of the parties under different strategies is constructed .T he corresponding replicator dynamic equation is established ,and the evolutionary stable strategy is discussed .T hrough the analysis of the model ,the mechanism of the influence factors act-ing on the initial state of the industrial commensalism behavior strategy evolution is obtained .