CAJ | 학술논문

研究目的：以武汉、南京、广州三市为例，量化分析土地市场中开发商行贿的表征。研究方法：Logistic模型及Moran指数。研究结果：（1）开发商行贿在“供给”和“需求”两种力量的推动下进行；（2）开发商行贿具有区域集聚性和区域差异性。研究结论：（1）在宏观因素和微观因素的影响下，开发商行贿是出于对制度环境和企业实力通盘考虑后作出的理性选择，具有不得已而为之的被动性；（2）开发商行贿有一定的空间相关性，且高一高关联的特征最为显著。
연구목적：이무한、남경、엄주삼시위례，양화분석토지시장중개발상행회적표정。연구방법：Logistic모형급Moran지수。연구결과：（1）개발상행회재“공급”화“수구”량충역량적추동하진행；（2）개발상행회구유구역집취성화구역차이성。연구결론：（1）재굉관인소화미관인소적영향하，개발상행회시출우대제도배경화기업실력통반고필후작출적이성선택，구유불득이이위지적피동성；（2）개발상행회유일정적공간상관성，차고일고관련적특정최위현저。
The purpose of this study is to conduct a quantitative analysis on the bribery behaviors of the developers in land market, taking Wuhan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou as the cases. Methods of logistic model and moran index are employed. The resuhs show that 1 ） developers＇ bribery is driven by two forces i.e., the ＂supply＂ and ＂demand＂ forces;2） there are regional agglomeration and regional difference in developers＇bribery. The research concludes that 1 ）regarding the impact of macro and micro factors the bribery behaviors of the developers is a rational choice because developers have taken into account the overall condition based on the system environment and business strength, i.e., a passive behaviors; 2） bribery behaviors of the developers are spatially correlated, and the high-high correlation is most significant.